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ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS FOR INTERIM/STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS
We do not know yet the exact shape of our future military, but we know the direction we must begin to travel. On land, our heavy forces will be lighter. Our light forces will be more lethal. All will be easier to deploy and sustain. Teams may prove useful in several scenarios. These scenarios might include: Programming decisions by senior leaders that impact the Army's plan to field the number of I/SBCTs currently programmed; continued testing of the current I/SBCT organization that uncovers shortfalls in desired capabilities; or future Army decisions to field I/SBCT-type capabilities to other segments of the legacy force. This paper will examine these scenarios and identify alternative I/SBCT structures that might be applied against them. This paper does not seek to debate the need for Army transformation nor the need for or viability of the current I/SBCT structure-in fact, I believe strongly in both. Instead, my goal is to identify some foreseeable situations in which alternative structures for the I/SBCTs might prove useful as well as to introduce at a basic level, some organizational structures that might serve as start points for future examination.
To adjust the condition of the Army to better meet the requirements of the next century, we articulate this vision: "Soldiers on point for the Nation transforming this, the most respected Army in the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations.
Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki

INITIAL MARCHING ORDERS: THE CHIEF'S VISION
In order to provide alternatives to the current Interim/Stryker Brigade organization, it is first useful to understand how the Army arrived at it. For this, we look back to General Shinseki's speech during the Eisenhower luncheon at the annual convention of the Association of the United States Army in mid-October 1999. His remarks contained a surprise announcement of a long-range and ambitious three-pronged plan to transform the entire Army in order to improve its strategic responsiveness and relevance for the future. General Shinseki began by reviewing the situation faced by then Secretary of War Elihu Root and Commanding General of the Army Major General Nelson Miles at the turn of the twentieth century. He noted the many similarities that existed then and now for our Army-downsized, deployed around the world and hardpressed to meet operational commitments. General Shinseki remarked that even the most prescient observers of the day did not predict the first world-wide war less than 15 years away, an international economic disaster less than 30 years away or a second war, even larger and more world-changing than the first, less than 50 years away.
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The Chief of Staff then drew parallels to the present, opining that, as in 1899, it is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty what specific situations the world and the American Army will face in the coming century but that, "today, as in 1899, the fundamental business of the Army is to fight and win our Nation's wars." Then reviewing the capabilities of today's standing Army as it faces this uncertain future General Shinseki stated, Our superb heavy divisions remain unequalled in their ability to gain and hold ground in the most intense, horrifying direct fire battles we could imagine... But these same divisions are challenged to get to...contingencies where we have not laid the deployment groundwork....and once deployed, it takes significant effort and cost to sustain them. Our magnificent light forces-the toughest light infantry in the world-can strike lightning fast but lack staying power, lethality and tactical mobility once inserted. Today, 90% of our lift requirement is composed of our logistics tail...our logistical footprints for deployed forces are unacceptably large, driven sometimes by unrealistic replenishment demands but also by a complex inventory of multiple types of equipment....
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To better prepare for this uncertain future, the Army of the 21st Century must be "strategically responsive" and yet remain "dominant across the full spectrum of operations."
Having outlined that overarching goal, General Shinseki went on to announce a "a major transformation" which would accomplish several things:
First, reducing lift requirements by reducing the logistical tails of Army organizations as well as reducing the footprints of units once they are deployed. One way this would be accomplished would be to design systems that were strategically deployable aboard C-17s, tactically deployable aboard a "C-130-like" aircraft and by seeking common platforms, chassis and standard caliber designs that reduced spare parts requirements and that were smaller, lighter, more lethal, and yet more reliable, fuel efficient and survivable.
Second, the Army would give our nation's decision makers a "genuine deterrent capability" by developing combat systems that would permit the deployment of a combat brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days-ambitious goals to be sure.
General Shinseki stated that this transformation was to begin "immediately" and, in order to "jump-start" the process, the Army would rapidly develop an "initial" or "interim" capability.
This initial brigade would use "off the shelf" equipment to "stimulate the development of doctrine, organizational design and leader training," in effect providing the Army with both an immediate solution to bridge the existing gap between the capabilities of the Army's heavy and light forces as well as serving as an experimental test-bed for the future Objective Force. The Chief of Staff identified Fort Lewis, Washington as the home of this initial brigade; set the bar for forming this unit with an initial set of prototype vehicles within one year; and concluded with, "other units will follow!"
3 It is no exaggeration to say that this speech caught the attention of many observers and sent shock waves rippling throughout the Army, industry and the defense establishment. for these wargames ranged from peace-keeping operations through small-scale contingencies and up to major combat operations.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERIM BRIGADE
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From this simulation-based analysis, emerged the organizational design that became the Interim Brigade Combat Team. These simulations suggested that the optimum design was one that imbedded organic combined arms capabilities at levels significantly lower than found in the Legacy force. However, the simulations also indicated that the lethality, survivability and redundancy required for effectiveness at the higher-intensity levels of conflict necessarily caused unwanted growth in the size and weight of the brigade's organization-the exact problem with the Legacy Force's heavy divisions.
To solve this dilemma TRADOC recommended optimizing the brigade design for smallerscale contingencies and combat at the low to medium-intensity range of conflict. 11 Then, in order to maintain utility for higher-intensity combat operations, while still achieving good levels of deployability and sustainability, trade-offs were made with the goal of imbedding a combined arms structure to the lowest level. Certain capabilities were excluded from the brigade's organic structure while personnel and C2 "hooks" or links were imbedded in the formation to allow for augmenting the brigade with additional resources when needed. Due to present technological constraints, the field artillery battalion is probably the least progressive of the I/SBCT's organizations. Organized to provide the brigade supporting indirect fires with a special focus on the counter-battery mission, the artillery battalion is equipped with the same M198 truck-towed 155mm howitzer found in the Legacy Force.
19 As the Army simultaneously develops and fields the I/SBCT, it continues to examine technological solutions to bring the artillery battalion on par with the rest of the brigade. Potential solutions include a new lightweight howitzer under development, a Stryker-vehicle mounted self-propelled howitzer and a truck-mounted multiple-launch rocket system known as HIMARS.
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The engineer company provides mobility support to the brigade with its three organic engineer platoons. Each platoon is to be equipped with organic mine plow and roller attachments for their three Stryker engineer vehicles.
The signal company's mission is to provide the command and control communications to support distributed operations in urban or other complex terrain across extended and noncontiguous operational distances. Additionally the company is equipped with sufficient satellite linkages to provide the architecture so the I/SBCT can interface with higher headquarters, typically an Army division, corps or a Joint Task Force.
Operating as an extension of the brigade's intelligence officer, the military intelligence company plans, coordinates, manages and provides analysis support to the advanced imbedded intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of the I/SBCT. The company also provides the necessary architecture to allow the I/SBCT to interface with other ISR systems at Army, joint, theater and even national levels. Pennsylvania Army National Guard. 25 The cost of converting each of these brigades is currently estimated at about $1.5 billion each. how the two follow-on brigades would, if funded, have greater combat capability than the first four. One "senior defense official" even proposed that an alternative to fielding the last two brigades would be to use the same money to increase the combat power of the first four. In either of these scenarios, in lieu of fielding fewer of the current-sized I/SBCTs, the Army might elect to field the planned six brigades with a lower vehicle density than currently envisioned or even field an entirely different organizational design altogether.
SCENARIO 2: THE I/SBCT DOESN'T MEET EXPECTATIONS IN CERTAIN AREAS
As has already been established, the I/SBCT is to be a medium-weight organization that 
Expectations for Deployment
The first potential shortcoming is in the area of strategic agility or deployability. The Army initially set a goal for the I/SBCT to complete its deployment from home station within 96 hours of the first takeoff and to begin its operations immediately upon arrival-without significant delays to draw, redistribute, or assemble supplies or key pieces of equipment. One of the few key performance parameters of the Interim Force is for all major fighting elements of the I/SBCT to be deployable by C-130 Hercules aircraft. The Army envisions that the I/SBCT will deploy to a regional crisis by a combination of C-17 wide-bodied airlifter and sealift. Once in the theater, the I/SBCT moves into its zone of action by ground or by air on board C-17s or C-130s in the intra-theater airlift role. Whether the C-130 air transportability requirement is necessary at all or not is certainly debatable, however it is one that the Army has hung its hat on and as a result has drawn no small amount of criticism.
The concern about inter-theater deployability is both conceptual and real. Conceptually, the I/SBCTs make armored firepower, protection and mobility more rapidly deployable. In one sense, this is a clear success story. Army estimates indicate that using C-17 sorties as a measure, the I/SBCT requires about half the number of sorties that a Legacy Force mechanized brigade requires-approximately 212 versus 430. 32 However, here the theory collides with the fact that of the five active component I/SBCTs that are first to convert, four of them are formed by converting light brigades into medium brigades. 33 While these four brigades will certainly have greater combat capability than they had before, it is equally certain they are less deployable than they were before with the addition of more than 300 armored vehicles. Combat capability at the point of action notwithstanding, the net effect of converting one heavy brigade and four light brigades to I/SBCT configuration is to increase, not decrease, the Army's deployment challenge per brigade size unit.
In the real sense, the Army has gone to significant lengths to reduce the challenges of deploying the I/SBCTs. After early simulation-based analysis pointed out challenges in this area, the Army reduced the number of wheeled vehicles, including Strykers, that each I/SBCT would field including a 25 percent cut in the number of Mobile Gun Systems in each brigade.
Additionally, personnel positions were eliminated resulting in nearly 400 fewer personnel in each brigade. The result of these reductions was a net decrease in the deployment weight of the IBCT, including supplies for the first 72 hours, from over 12,500 short tons to about 10,000 short tons. However, these cuts may not go far enough. The Army's own studies demonstrate that, given current airlift constraints, for the Air Force to deploy an I/SBCT by air within 96 hours, its weight must be under 8,000 short tons-a weight that will be difficult to achieve given current technology without significant change in the brigade's organization. 34 Even further lightening of the footprint of the I/SBCT may not be of that much help according to a recent Rand study commissioned by the Air Force. According to the study, to achieve the 96 hour goal, the Air
Force would have to launch a C-17 every 15 minutes around the clock for nearly 4 days. The study further observes that airport infrastructure in much of the third world is not likely in a state to be able to receive such an intense and sustained airlift operation. The study concludes optimistically by noting that with a combination of forward basing, pre-positioning and air and sealift the I/SBCTs should be able to reach most of the globe in about 10 days-a significant improvement in the deployment of armored forces, light or otherwise. 35 In light of these studies, the Army has chosen to accentuate this positive trend and has recently been de-emphasizing the 96-hour requirement with respect to the interim force and casting it as a goal for the objective force.
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Finally, in the intra-theater realm is the Army's requirement for the I/SBCT to be airlifted in C-130s. The Army has gone to great lengths to demonstrate this capability in face of criticism that it is unnecessary, unrealistic or impossible. Those who say it is unnecessary point to the intra-theater and unimproved forward landing strip abilities of the C-17, improving fast sealift capabilities as well as the reality that after arriving at a major air or seaport, the I/SBCT's superb wheeled mobility allows it to quickly road-march distances that a mechanized or light force would find very difficult to match. For those who say it is unrealistic or impossible, including 
Expectations for Employment
The second area for potential shortfall is in employment-the ability of the Brigade to fight and accomplish its mission along the entire spectrum of conflict. To the Army's credit, it conducted extensive simulations-based testing in order to design the optimum structure for the I/SBCT. This testing in simulation is being followed with aggressive field trials, using surrogate equipment, to test prototype organizations and concepts. 38 The Army's efforts on getting the organization's design right up front have resulted in good levels of satisfaction among I/SBCT leaders. 39 However, even with these early successes, some questions still remain, at apparently the highest levels, that the I/SBCT has the requisite capabilities to fight and win as envisioned.
First, in order to achieve a useful level of deployability, the Army optimized the I/SBCT structure for small scale contingencies (SSCs) while still leaving the structure sufficiently robust enough for the transition to heavy, sustained combat with minimal augmentation. However some of these trade-offs may have operational consequences as the Army gains experience with the fielded I/SBCTs. Some of these tradeoffs included reductions of Mobile Gun Systems (by 25 percent), anti-tank systems, separate weapons squads, battalion scout platoon capabilities, and target acquisition radars (from 3 to 2). Other key reductions included cuts in both artillery battalion and RSTA squadron headquarters and medical evacuation capabilities. The Army clearly believes the level of risk is acceptable with these reductions. However the final effects of this decision will not be clear in the near term. self-propelled and rocket artillery, precision munitions, unmanned vehicles and enhanced sustainment and command and control. The theory being these redesigned brigades would make a better bridge to the Objective Force if they more closely resembled its likely structure.
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Clearly these potential additions will almost certainly require change to the organizational design of the I/SBCT and thus the requirement for alternative structures. However, one of their benefits is that they will also likely bring the I/SBCT structure closer to the future design of the Objective Force; making the I/SBCT more effective in its "operational test-bed" role.
Expectations for Sustainment
The third area for potential shortfall in capability is in the battlefield function of sustainment-the ability of higher echelons or the I/SBCT itself to sustain the formation during combat operations in an austere environment. The Army has taken dramatic steps in reducing the logistics "footprint" of the I/SBCT in order to make it more agile-both strategically during deployment and tactically during employment. To achieve this unprecedented level of agility, the I/SBCT relies on several concepts.
Previously discussed is the idea of vehicle commonality-the I/BSCT relies on only four major vehicle types, the HMMWV light truck, the FMTV and HEMMT medium and heavy trucks and the primary fighting vehicle, the Stryker in its various configurations. Having the major fighting systems based on a common platform is an obvious advantage in reducing the stocks of repair parts that the brigade needs to deploy and maintain as well as reducing the number of brigade maintenance personnel as well as their training requirements.
42
Another innovation in logistics is called "Combat Service Support Reach" or CSS Reach.
This logistics strategy is specifically designed for the Army's transformation and is being applied to support the I/SBCT and, in future form, the Objective Force as well. CSS Reach seeks to leverage information technologies, developing best business practices, increased use of contractors, host-nation or multi-national support and improvements in fast, reliable transportation in order to reduce the deployed presence of logistics stockpiles and the personnel required to manage them.
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Additionally, the brigade is designed to operate without significant replenishment for a period of 72 hours after it arrives. To accomplish this, the brigade relies on the carrying capacity of its organic vehicles to carry the necessary stores-particularly food, ammunition, fuel and water-as well as pre-configured loads for resupply. The Army has made a bold judgment that the sum of these logistics innovations will get the job done. The projected logistical footprint of the I/SBCT is about half that of a legacy force heavy brigade and accomplishes the task with approximately 19 percent fewer logistics personnel. stockpiling was designed to preclude. In fact, there are indications that some of these companies are re-thinking their "just-in-time" practices and considering a move to a system that strikes a better balance between just-in-time and just-in-case.
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Other potential areas of risk or vulnerabilities of CSS reach are found in its reliance on information systems and information superiority as well as multiple sources of both supply and transportation. All of these areas become points of potential failure that carry a greater potential of negative impact than are likely in the more-traditional system of stockpiling in large amounts around the area of operations.
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Finally, some critics might point out that the proposed logistics footprint is entirely insufficient or that it hasn't been significantly reduced but rather it has been redistributed to other echelons. The Army's I/SBCT concept requires near simultaneous deployment of an "Echelons Above Brigade" (EAB) support "slice." This element can be tailored but generally
consists of approximately 200 personnel and accompanying vehicles and supplies. 47 The obvious question is that since this EAB support is not really optional what real gains are realized by removing it from the Brigade's organic structure?
As it stands today, almost all of these questions remain unanswered. The first I/SBCT is just now beginning to train, maneuver and operate as an entire brigade combat team. The battalion level training events they have successfully accomplished to this point have not yet sufficiently stressed the brigade's sustainment system to uncover shortfalls. The leaders of these organizations do have concerns-particularly in the areas of delivery of bulk water and fuel. 48 They are optimistic about finding solutions to any problems that arise and it is conceivable that these solutions will come in the form of organizational change.
Expectations for Training-A Unique Range of Infantry Skills
There were a lot of misconceptions about what this unit was going to be: Was it going to be just another mech unit?
Sergeant Joseph Sharpe Squad Leader, 3d SBCT, 2d Infantry Division
The fourth area of potential shortfall in desired capability is in the realm of maintenance and training-the ability of the brigades' leaders to maintain a uniquely high level of skill in both mounted and dismounted operations. As stated earlier, the Interim Force is to combine the best characteristics of current Army forces-heavy, light and special operations. The I/SBCT seeks to combine the tactical agility, protection and firepower of the Army's mechanized forces with the strategic agility, physical toughness, dismounted skill and versatility of light and special operations forces. The operational concept for the I/SBCT states that it achieves "decisive action through dismounted infantry assault." 49 The infantry unit training program of the I/SBCT is intended to produce the "world's best infantrymen" having "Ranger toughness and skills but with a level of tactical mobility, lethality and survivability that is unmatched."
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So why is this viewed as transformational? The simple answer lies in resources and specifically the most precious of resources: Time. The dilemma for mechanized or heavy infantry has always been in trying to achieve both mounted and dismounted expertise. The time required to maintain a complex fighting vehicle and proficiency in mounted crew drills and gunnery compete directly with the time necessary to develop the enhanced levels of physical fitness, skill with individual weapons and proficiency at dismounted drills and operations that are the hallmarks of light infantry. This is complicated by the competing demands of the "support" phase of the typical "Red-Amber-Green" or "Support-Mission-Training" cycle that further impact the time available to develop these skills. As a result only the best led and resourced mechanized units ever achieve acceptable levels of proficiency in both areas-this same dilemma faces the leaders of the I/SBCT. So how will they solve this problem? First, the Stryker ICV is more an armored taxi than a true fighting vehicle especially in comparison to the Bradley fighting vehicle. As a result, the requirements for gunnery and mounted drills should be less. Second, by design the wheeled Stryker should be significantly easier to maintain and operate than the tracked and more complex Bradley. Third, the Army is committed to providing the I/SBCT with high levels of personnel manning-thus Soldiers assigned to dismounted teams should be able to focus on those tasks and not on the tasks of the vehicle crewmen as is typical in legacy force mechanized units. Fourth, and most importantly, is in the area of resourcing. The I/SBCTs are achieving remarkable success because they enjoy resources sufficient to their needs-the most important of which is time.
For the most part, the I/SBCTs currently receive special priority for schooling and are shielded, or fenced, from any external distracters -much as Army special operations units are fenced from most "support taskings." The question is, will they continue to enjoy this same level of resourcing after they have been certified as mission ready or will they be forced to return to the routine cycle of training and support that plagues many leaders of mechanized units. There is no doubt that this question is on the minds of I/SBCT leaders such as Sergeant Sharpe. Pentagon officials noted that the Army's XVIIIth Airborne Corps might be a good place to add these capabilities saying, "Is there any reason to think that a unit like the 82d or the 10th
Mountain might profit in some way by having the kinds of assets assigned to it that are represented in these brigades?"
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A key role of the I/SBCTs is to provide joint warfighting commanders with a useful new option for decisive contingency response. 54 It is feasible that as warfighting commanders gain experience with I/SBCTs and as the brigades become engaged in supporting regional taskings, combatant commanders will call for more of them to be fielded. One General Dynamics spokesman opined that once the I/SBCTs start performing in the field, the Pentagon would be tempted to buy more, not fewer, of them. This is particularly true in the event that advanced technologies for the Future Combat System (FCS) do not mature rapidly enough to achieve the very ambitious goal of beginning to field the first Objective Force units of action in the 2008-2010 timeframe. The same General Dynamic spokesman noted, "...Future Combat System perhaps will not be there when they think it is, and they're going to have to go to something else." 55 Even if the technologies are realized on time, it is also possible that, as in the first scenario, future programming decisions may delay fielding of the Objective Force.
Another potential application is to the Army National Guard. In a recent initiative, the Army is reducing the Guard's heavy armored combat platforms by about one-third and replacing them with light and medium trucks to form Mobile Light Brigades-formations that would have greater utility for the War on Terror, peace-keeping or homeland security functions. Council was studying a proposal to reshape the Army's divisional structures. Rather than the current structures which organize the Army's divisions into different types-heavy, light, airborne and air assault-the proposal recommends the Army develop 10 divisions with identical structures and capabilities that could then participate in an operational readiness rotation much as the Navy's carrier battle groups and the Air Force's air expeditionary forces do now.
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In any of these situations, particularly the last, alternative organizational structures for the I/SBCTs may be considered as a potential solution.
I/SBCT ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES
Having now established that there are clearly several situations that might require an alternative organizational design for the Interim/Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, what might those designs look like? What, if anything, can be done differently than the current I/SBCT structure? In order to answer this question, we must first examine the requirement. What must the alternatives be able to do?
The answers to this question are, not so surprisingly, somewhat amorphous. The I/SBCT concept has evolved a great deal since General Shinseki's announcement. Thus requirements found in early guidance have in some cases been reinforced or deleted altogether in others.
Probably the best definitions of requirements are found in the I/SBCT Operational and Organizational concept (O&O).
BASELINE REQUIREMENTS
The bottom line is probably best expressed in the Army Chief of Staff's vision for the medium brigade: "Satisfy current needs to be more strategically responsive and capable in meeting Combatant Commander's requirements for Small Scale Contingencies without compromising our Major Theater War capability." This statement requires the I/SBCT to strike the most effective balance between force projection and battlespace dominance. The brigade is also required to provide balanced utility across the full spectrum of operations from stability and peace-keeping operations through small-scale contingencies, for which it is optimized, and including major theater war. Other key requirements for the I/SBCT include:
• Possess high levels of mobility (strategic, operational, and tactical)
o Deploy entire IBCT within 96 hours of first "wheels up"
o All combat elements of the Brigade are transportable by C-130
o All elements of the Brigade have 100% tactical mobility
• Operate routinely in distributed fashion-in non-linear, non-contiguous areas
• Organic combined-arms organization to company level
• Achieve decisive combat action through dismounted infantry assault supported by lethal direct and indirect fires and pro-active counter-battery fires
• Possess lethality and survivability approaching that of mechanized forces
• Minimize personnel and logistics footprint in theater
• Possess enhanced situational understanding, sustainment and Reachback capabilities
• Serve as a "bridge" to the Objective Force for requirements, tactics, procedures,
As is apparent from this list, with the exception of those related to mobility, these requirements are relatively subjective in nature. Even the mobility requirements are less concrete as they may have been earlier in the I/SBCT's development. As has already been discussed, the Army has recently backed away from the 96 hour strategic deployment requirement in the light of recent studies that indicate current Air Force capabilities and third world infrastructure realities make it next to impossible to achieve for the foreseeable future.
The Army seems accepting of the 7-10 day deployment timeline for the I/SBCT and it is certainly a quantum improvement over deployment times for a mechanized brigade. The 96 hour mark still stands as the deployment goal for the Objective Force. 59 Additionally, the C-130 transportability requirement seems less than an absolute benchmark as the Army faces realities of current technology as it seeks to equip the I/SBCT with the complete Stryker vehicle system as well as the Air Force's position that the C-17 will without question be a part of any I/SBCT deployment in the future.
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With these requirements as the benchmarks, let us now turn to a brief examination of some generic designs for alternative I/SBCT organization.
I/SBCT-LITE, I/SBCT 2+1 AND I/SBCT LITE-3
The first generic design type is one which the Army has already considered and tested extensively in simulation: an I/SBCT configured much as the current design but with two infantry maneuver battalions instead of three-I call it I/SBCT-Lite. The two-battalion brigade design was seriously considered by the Army during development of the I/SBCT organization.
Analysis in simulated wargames indicated that the two-battalion design worked in stability operations, peace-keeping and combat in small scale contingencies. Further, the two-battalion design would reduce the brigade's transport requirement by almost one third if an associated reduction were made in the brigade's combat support and combat service support structure as well.
However, compared to the three-battalion design, the two-battalion design did have some drawbacks. First, as might be expected, the two-battalion design reduced the operational coverage and flexibility of the brigade. Second, it reduced the ability of the brigade commander to maintain sufficient reserves at all levels. The analysis also showed that as the brigade encountered more intense combat operations as it moved up the spectrum of conflict towards major theater war, the brigade with only two infantry battalions tended to use the RSTA squadron as a maneuver force. Finally, the three-battalion design was determined to provide a better capability to transition from SSCs to MTW.
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Because the two-battalion design did accomplish the mission during the SSCs that the I/SBCT was being optimized for, the Army considered it among the courses of action for the final design. However, in the end, the three-battalion design won out.
Two modifications to I/SBCT-Lite would also be possible. We'll call the first I/SBCT 2+1 and the second I/SBCT Lite-3. I/SBCT 2+1 was also considered by the Army in its analysis-a brigade design that had two battalions of Stryker infantry and a third maneuver battalion of "something other than motorized" infantry. If the third battalion were a battalion of light infantry, the brigade design would be considerably more affordable to field, easier to transport by air and would retain significantly more operational flexibility and combat capability than a pure twobattalion design. 62 The light infantry battalion could be foot-mobile once in theater or augmented with trucks from echelons above brigade, just as current legacy force light infantry is. If 100 percent organic mobility is an absolute requirement, the light battalion could have its own organic light or medium trucks, much like the proposed new National Guard Mobile Light
Brigades, but equipped with FBCB2 and crew-served weapons to provide enhanced situational awareness and firepower. Current light infantry units are considered to be full-spectrum forces, especially in complex terrain, although it is widely recognized they require augmentation for combat in an MTW environment. The light battalion in an I/SBCT would arrive in theater considerably more "augmented" than in a legacy force light brigade.
The third option, I/SBCT Lite-3, is a modification of the 2+1 design. In this design, the brigade would still have three infantry battalions. However, each battalion would have two companies of Stryker infantry and one company of truck-mounted light infantry. The considerations for Lite-3 are similar to 2+1 but it has the advantage that each battalion is organized in the same way.
Although I/SBCT-Lite, 2+1 and Lite-3 organizational designs would certainly have somewhat less combat power than the current design, they should be kept in consideration since they have been shown to work in applications ranging up through SSCs and have potential as possible solutions to some of the scenarios already discussed. They offer a solution if, as in scenario one, future programming decisions affect the Army's ability to field six brigades of the current design. By eliminating the third infantry battalion in every I/SBCT, or all or most of its Strykers, the resulting savings could potentially permit the Army to field another I/SBCT. Similarly, these designs might also work if the I/SBCT proves less deployable than desired or other shortcomings emerge in practical application.
I/SBCT "APPLIQUE"
The second alternative organizational design that may prove useful to the Army in the future is what I call I/SBCT-Applique. Much like applique armor is added to a vehicles' existing structure, in this alternative design lower-level I/SBCT organizations could be applied to existing light divisions or replace existing elements in selected heavy divisions. There are several capabilities the I/SBCT possesses that many legacy force commanders might find highly desirable. Here we will briefly consider five of them: the I/SBCT itself, the Mobile Gun System, The Stryker Infantry Carrier, the RSTA Squadron and organic combined arms organization.
The I/SBCT "Graft"
First is the I/SBCT itself. The existing I/SBCT organization could be grafted onto selected legacy force divisions-say for example, in the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. An I/SBCT would replace one brigade in the current divisional structure. Although the I/SBCT is designed to work as part of a division, this permanent one-for-one replacement might require some minimal modification to the current I/SBCT design in order to allow it to interface with the division it was being grafted onto. In the XVIIIth Corps' heavy element, the 3d Mechanized Division, the replacement of one of its heavy brigades with an I/SBCT would significantly increase the mobility of the division at all levels, strategic, operational and tactical, but at some cost in firepower and protection. In the Corps' three light divisions, the 10th Mountain, the 82d
Airborne and the 101st Air Assault, the I/SBCT would dramatically increase each division's ground combat power-particularly in the areas of firepower, protection and tactical mobility. Of course, in these three divisions, the costs would include a decrease in strategic mobilityalthough the 101st might be able to reduce some aviation assets if it added an I/SBCT. The addition of I/SBCTs to each of the light divisions in XVIIIth Airborne Corps may make it feasible to reorganize the 3d Mechanized Division to the IIId Corps which, as the Army's counter-attack corps, will retain the Army's heavy legacy forces until the Future Combat System and the Objective Force become a reality sometime in the future. An added benefit of this option is that it maximizes the advantages of developing technologies and gets the entire Army involved in the transformation process as it moves forward to the Objective Force.
The Mobile Gun System Applique
A second desirable and readily transferable capability is the Mobile Gun Systemespecially for legacy force light infantry units. In the not too distant past the 82d Airborne Division had an organic battalion of light armored reconnaissance vehicles, M551 Sheridans, which were eventually retired due to maintenance issues owing to their advancing age. In addition to reconnaissance duties, these "airborne light tanks" performed many of the same functions that MGS will perform when fielded. Further, until the Army cancelled the M-8
Armored Gun System program (AGS) in 1996, one of the prime customers was to be 82d
Airborne Division which has been without its air-transportable light tank capability since the Sheridans were retired. 63 Whether organized in platoons in existing infantry battalions, as companies in each existing brigade or as a separate battalion at division level, the MGS gives the Army the ability to significantly improve the lethality of its legacy force light divisions in short order.
The Stryker Infantry Carrier Applique
Just RSTA squadron has shown it can provide the brigade commander with superb enemy situational awareness by its ability to saturate the battle-space with sensors. This capability combined with superb digital connectivity allows the RSTA squadron to keep all elements of the I/SBCT aware of the enemy situation to an unprecedented degree. 64 This capability could significantly enhance the effectiveness of current legacy force divisions by integrating it into existing cavalry squadrons at division level or, better still, by providing each existing brigade with its own RSTA-like squadron.
Organic Combined Arms Organization
One of the simplest I/SBCT capabilities to apply to the legacy force is the concept of organic combined arms organization imbedded to unprecedented levels. Legacy force units typically practice temporary task organization to the brigade and battalion task force and company team levels. Even if routine habitual associations are rigorously enforced, it is certainly not "training as we will fight" if our units live and conduct routine training and missions with one unit but reorganize to train and fight with another. The Army's rigorous testing of the I/SBCT and Objective Force concepts in simulations unambiguously found that the entire organization performs better and achieves greater synergy with less friction if combined arms organization is imbedded at lower levels. 65 The I/SBCT organizes organic combined arms at the company level-and it remains to be seen if this takes the practice as far as it can go. One way to quickly improve the combat performance of the legacy force while beginning to prepare
Army leaders for the future Objective Force, all at little cost, is to re-organize our legacy force units into organic combined arms teams at the battalion or even company level now. Apaches, OH-58D Kiowa Warriors or RAH-66 Commanches), utility helicopters (UH-60s) as well as special purpose platforms like command and control aircraft or EH-60 electronic warfare aircraft. Like the I/SBCT-Lite variations, the Air-Ground Stryker Team design is also one that has been examined by the Army. An essential feature of the older "Strike Force" design, the Air-Ground Stryker team concept is still part of the proposed structure for the redesign of the 2d
Armored Cavalry Regiment also known as the Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR).
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In the Air-Ground Stryker Team design that I propose for the I/SBCT, I recommend the substitution of an aviation squadron for one of the three infantry battalions. At a minimum, the I/SBCT aviation squadron would consist of two recon-attack troops flying C-130 transportable OH-58Ds until replaced by RAH-66 Commanches in the future. The squadron would also have an assault company flying enough UH-60s to lift at least an infantry company-plus in one lift-at least 15.
Further analysis would have to be done to determine the fiscal costs of this proposal-but generally, aviation capabilities are expensive in the long term. Those who believe that ground brigade commanders can't properly train and control organic aviation units have only to look at the historical success of Army cavalry or Marine air-ground teams to realize that they already do it every day when task-organized for exercises and actual operations. Besides, who's to say that the I/SBCT commander might not be an aviator? On the positive side of the ledger, this proposal would allow the I/SBCT to retain three maneuver battalions. Though unable to retain terrain, the aviation squadron would allow the I/SBCT to influence a significantly larger area of operations and give it capabilities for air assaults as well as aerial resupply and casualty evacuation-key capabilities for distributed operations.
Additionally, there might actually be some improvement in mobility at strategic and operational levels. A C-17 can carry three Strykers but can also carry five OH-58Ds or two UH60s. Once in theater, the UH-60s could be flown directly to forward strips aboard C-17s or offloaded and self-deployed into the forward area. The OH-58Ds could be landed directly from C17s, trans-loaded onto C-130s or self-deploy. 68 Finally, the aviation squadron would increase the I/SBCT's combat power through the powerful reconnaissance and precision engagement capabilities found in Army aviation.
The Air-Ground Stryker Team design provides the I/SBCT with capabilities planned for the Objective Force unit of action, and that DoD has asked the Army to consider providing to I/SBCTs five and six, and would improve the I/SBCTs function in its role as a bridge to the Objective Force.
CONCLUSION
The Army is embarked on a rapid, sweeping, triple-axis transformation, seeking to become more strategically responsive while it maintains its dominance across the entire spectrum of conflict, both now and in the future. At the same time the Army must stay ready to fight the wars that America may find itself in tomorrow. This is a tall order by any measure.
One of the three axes of this transformation plan is the formation of an Interim Force, also The Army has already examined some alternative designs and should make an effort to continue with this study. Some alternative designs for the Stryker brigades can be found by lightening the personnel or equipment structure of the current design. Others by applying selected elements of the current Stryker design to existing units to develop new combinations of capabilities in the legacy force. Finally, a bolder design approach can be found by applying the power of Army aviation to the already flexible, mobile and lethal Stryker brigade design.
All of these approaches, as well as others still to be discovered, might very well prove useful as the Army's transformation program proceeds and the first Stryker Brigade Combat
Teams of the Interim Force become a reality.
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